Best international relations books of 2013

This allows for coordination, and enables players to move from the strategy with the lowest combined payoff (both cheat) to the strategy with the highest combined payoff (both cooperate). Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. The reason is because the traditional PD game does not fully capture the strategic options and considerations available to each player. The question becomes, why donвЂ™t they always cheat? Why do trade agreements even exist? The Nash equilibrium for each nation is to cheat, so it would be irrational to do otherwise. You note that the temptation to cheat creates tension between the two trading nations, but you could phrase this much more strongly: theoretically, both players SHOULD cheat. Your application of the PrisonerвЂ™s Dilemma (PD) game to international trade agreements raises a few very interesting and important questions for the application of game theory to real-life strategic situations. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. On the face of it, the USSR вЂњSwervedвЂќ, but I believe that both sides actually made concessions, although the US made theirs later on, to save face. A great example of chicken in IR is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Collision isВ disastrousВ for everyone, but swerving is losing bad too.

For example, most land disputes, like the ongoing Chinese andВ Japanese disputeВ over the Senkaku Islands, must be resolved byВ compromisingВ in other areas of policy in order to achieve the goal.ДЇinally, in the game of chicken, two sides race to collision in the hopes that the other swerves from the path first. Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forВ sovereigntyВ reasons, or because they areВ experiencingВ great economic gain. The closestВ approximationВ of this in International Relations are universal treaties, like the KyotoВ ProtocolВ environmental treaty. However, anyone who hunts rabbit can do soВ successfullyВ by themselves, but with a smaller meal. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. This is why international tradeВ negotiationsВ are often tense and difficult. They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. One nation can then cheat on the agreement, and receives more of a benefit at the cost of the other. Both nations can benefit by working together and signing the agreement. A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. They are the only body responsible for their own protection. In international relations terms, the states exist in anarchy. In this example, each player has a dominantВ strategy. We are all familiar with the basic Prisoners Dilemma. I will apply them to IR and give an example for each. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. Using game theory as a way of modelingВ strategicallyВ motivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues.

Best international relations books of 2013